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POSSESSION OF A BANKRUPT TAXPAYER'S INTANGIBLE
PROPERTY
For trustees in bankruptcy or federal tax authorities to claim from
third parties the intangible assets of an insolvent or reluctant taxpayer, control over the assets must be established pursuant to rigid
statutory schemes. Trustees in bankruptcy trace their claims to
such assets from the filing of a petition in bankruptcy under section
70a of the Bankruptcy Act,' an event which has been constxued to
give the court summary jurisdiction over all property in the bankrupt's estate2 which the trustee has reduced to either actual or constructive possession.3 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) predicates its claim to control on the operation of section 6331 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which authorizes the seizure of
"property and rights to property" by a notice of levy which may be
served
on third parties in possession of the debtor-taxpayer's prop4
erty.

1. Section 70a provides, in part:
The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt. . . upon his. . appointment and
qualification, shall . . . be vested by operation of law with the title of the
bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition initiating a proceeding under
this title. . . to all of the following kinds of property wherever located. . . (5)
property, including-rights of action, which prior to the filing of the petition he
could by any means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and
sold under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or
sequestered . . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970).
2. See Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426 (1924). Various sections of the
Bankruptcy Act prescribe the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. Section 2a enumerates
certain powers that the court may exercise, including the power to "[c]ause the estates of
bankrupts to be collected, reduced to money, and distributed, and determine controversies
in relation thereto. . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(7) (1970). Section 2a(7) also recognizes that the
bankruptcy court may exercise summary jurisdiction where "an adverse party does not interpose objection to the summary jurisdiction of the court of bankruptcy. . . ." Id.
Where an objection has been made to the exercise of summary jurisdiction by the bankruptcy court, the power of the receiver or trustee to proceed in a district court by means of a
plenary suit is recognized by section 23a which provides:
The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction of all controversies
at law and in equity, as distinguished from proceedings under this [Act], between receivers and trustees as such and adverse claimants, concerning the
property acquired or claimed by the receivers or trustees, in the same manner
and to the same extent as though such proceedings had not been instituted and
such controversies had been between the bankrupts and such adverse claimants.
11 U.S.C. § 46(a) (1970).
Whether the federal government, after service of a notice of levy on a third party debtor of
the bankrupt, has sufficient interest in the disputed property that the trustee should be
required to proceed by means of a plenary suit is the issue to be resolved in this Comment.
3. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940). See note 14 infra.
4. INT. Rzv. CODE OF 1954, § 6331(a) provides: "If any person liable to pay any tax neglects
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Recent decisions indicate that the spoils of victory, however, will
not necessarily inure to the party which follows the appropriate
statutory procedures in an attempt to establish its claim to the
assets first in time. While it appears settled that the filing of a
petition in bankruptcy gives a bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction over these assets if filed prior to service of a notice of levy by
the IRS, 5 the courts of appeals have been unable to agree whether
serving the notice of levy on a third party holder before the petition
is filed precludes courts of bankruptcy from exercising summary
jurisdiction over controverted intangible assets.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in In re United
General Wood Products Corp.' that the institution of bankruptcy
proceedings endowed a trustee in bankruptcy with constructive
possession of an indebtedness, owed the bankrupt by a factoring
company despite the prior service of notice of levy on the factor by
the IRS. Since the factor registered no claim to the debtor's assets,
the court of appeals ruled that the bankruptcy court had exercised
properly its summary jurisdiction when it found constructive possession in the trustee "where the property is held by some other
person who makes no claim to it . . . .' The Government contended that it had acquired constructive possession of the intangibles by serving notice of levy on the factor, thereby making it an
adverse claimant. Declining to transfer "tax fictions into bankruptcy cases," the court refused to accord the Government the status of an adverse claimant and upheld the jurisdiction of the bank8
ruptcy court.
Subsequently, however, the.iRS prevailed in a similar case, In re
ChicagolandIdeel Cleaners,Inc.,9 in which the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit held that service of notice of levy on an assignee for the benefit of creditors gave the Government sufficient possession of the intangible assets in controversy to deny the trustee
possession, thus barring the bankruptcy court from exercising sumor refuses to pay the same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the
Secretary or his delegate to collect such tax... by levy upon all property and rights to
property... belonging to such person or on which there is a lien provided in this chapter
for the payment of such tax."
5. See, e.g., United States v. Speers, 382 U.S. 266 (1965).

6. 483 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1973).
7. Id. at 976, quotingTaubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 433 (1924).
8.Id. at 977.
9. 495 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir.), cert. granted sub nor. Phelps v. United States, 95 S. Ct. 651
(1974).
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mary jurisdiction. Precluded from utilizing summary procedures in
bankruptcy court, the trustee's sole avenue for contesting the Government's claim to property is a plenary suit in federal district
court. 0
Consideration of the limits of the summary jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court supports the Chicagoland holding. Because the
very existence of a conflict between the two courts indicates that the
Government's claim to possession was premised upon more than a
merely colorable claim, a bankruptcy court should not have- attempted to resolve the issue of the effect upon possession of a notice
of levy served before a petition in bankruptcy was filed. Moreover,
the effect given to notice of levy in other contexts within the Bankruptcy Act indicates that the notice should deprive the bankruptcy
court of jurisdiction over the controverted property unless the adverse claimants consent to proceedings before the bankruptcy court.
Summary Jurisdictionof the Bankruptcy Court
One of the primary purposes underlying the establishment of special bankruptcy courts was to offer insolvent debtors and their creditors a speedy means for settling controversies without complex legal
battles prolonged by complicated court rules and procedures."
Summary jurisdiction is the essential element in such a plan. Although a bankruptcy court may be empowered to employ many of
the same judiciary procedures as a district court to resolve complex
10. Even though the issue of the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is decided
adversely to the trustee, the asset is not excluded automatically from the estate of the
bankrupt. The trustee yet may recover the property by means of a plenary suit. Freeman v.
Mayer, 253 F.2d 295 (3d Cir. 1958). The distinction between summary and plenary jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings can be misleading. If summary jurisdiction is found lacking,
plenary jurisdiction is not an alternative available within the bankruptcy court itself. Summary jurisdiction is the only type of jurisdiction possessed by bankruptcy courts (subject to
an exception in Chapter X corporate reorganization matters); if the case is to proceed by
plenary suit, it must be pursued outside the bankruptcy court in the federal district court
where it proceeds as an orainary civil action. The district court does not sit in its capacity as
a bankruptcy court, nor is the matter referred to a referee. See Treister, BankruptcyJurisdiction: Is it Too Summary?, 39 So. CAL. L. REv. 78 (1966).
11. In Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328-29 (1966), the Supreme Court noted: "[Tihis
Court has long recognized that a chief purpose of the bankruptcy laws is 'to secure a prompt
and effectual administration and settlement of the estate of all bankrupts within a limited
period,' Ex parte Christy, 3 How. 292, 312, and that provision for summary disposition,
'without regard to usual modes of trial attended by some necessary delay,' is one of the means
chosen by Congress to effectuate that purpose, Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 346."
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issues,' 2 it normally should avoid adjudication of questions that
would entail inordinate diversion of its efforts from the expeditious
resolution of more routine bankruptcy matters or those matters for
which it has special responsibilities.' 3
Some disputes concerning possession thus are placed outside the
summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Property within the
possession of the bankrupt is within the summary jurisdiction of the
court, and the court, concomitant to determining its jurisdiction,
may decide that some property not within the actual possession of
the bankrupt is within his constructive possession so as to fall within
the jurisdiction of the court. 4 Property not in possession against
which more than merely colorable adverse claims are made, how12. For a summary of the jurisdiction and powers of courts of bankruptcy, see 1 COLLER
ON BANK urrCy
2.05, 2.06, 2.46 (14th ed. 1971); 2 Coium ON Bmmupr
23.02-23.11
(14th ed. 1971). The referee is generally granted the use of the powers of the court. See 2
RE UNGTON ON BmmuproC Ch. XVII (1957). The combination of administrative and judicial
functions in the referee, however, has been criticized. See Triester, supra note 10. The primary distinction between the adjudication of an issue in the bankruptcy court and in a court
exercising plenary jurisdiction is the limitation of the right to trial by jury in bankruptcy.
This concept is illustrated in In re Swope, 466 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1114 (1973), where it was held that there was no right to trial by jury of the dischargeability
of a debt under section 17c(5), 11 U.S.C. 35(c)(5) (1970). See also Countryman, The New
DischargeabilityLaw, 45 Am. BANK. L.J. 1, 34 (1971).
13. Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970), gives the bankruptcy
court sweeping powers over certain corporate reorganizations. For a discussion of the purposes
of this control, see SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965).
14. See Harris v. Avery Brundage Co., 305 U.S. 160 (1938); May v. Henderson, 268 U.S.
111 (1925); Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426 (1924); Babbitt v. Dutcher, 216
U.S. 102 (1910); First Nat'l Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 198 U.S. 280 (1905) (bankruptcy court should have dismissed proceedings upon its finding no actual or constructive
possession in bankrupt); Whitney v. Wenman, 198 U.S. 539 (1905) (bankruptcy court had
jurisdiction to determine whether bankrupt had actual or constructive possession); Mueller
v. Nugent, 184 U.S. 1 (1902). The Court stated in Taubel:
The possession, which was thus essential [for a bankruptcy court to obtain]
jurisdiction, need not be actual. Constructive possession is sufficient. It exists
where the property was in the physical possession of the debtor at the time of
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, but was not delivered by him to the
trustee; where the property was delivered to the trustee, but was thereafter
wrongfully withdrawn from his custody; where the property is in the hands of
the bankrupt's agent or bailee; where the property is held by some other person
who makes no claim to it; and where the property is held by one who makes a
claim, but the claim is colorable only. As every court must have power to
determine, in the first instance, whether it has jurisdiction to proceed, the
bankruptcy court has, in every case, jurisdiction to determine whether it has
possession actual or constructive.
264 U.S. at 432-33 (footnotes omitted).
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ever, cannot be deemed to be within the bankrupt's constructive
possession;' 5 the bankruptcy court therefore is precluded from resolving controversies concerning such property unless the bankrupt
has physical possession or the adverse claimant's consent to the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. Because of the extent of and confusion in litigation over the effect upon possession of a notice of levy
served upon a third party holder, it is apparent that the Government's claims in Chicagoland and General Woods were more than
merely colorably adverse; no constructive possession by the debtortaxpayer should be found in such a case, at least until Congress or
the courts resolve the issue. Accordingly, absent physical or constructive possession in the bankrupt conferring jurisdiction upon the
bankruptcy court, the appropriate means for resolving the effect of
the controverted notice is by plenary suit in district court.
Difficulties inherent in resolving some questions of possession,
and thus justifying denial of the bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction, are illustrated by FirstNationalBank v. Bailes18 in which
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was presented with a fact
situation analogous to those in Chicagoland and General Wood. In
Bailes the trustee in bankruptcy sought an order that would require
certain funds derived from the sale of books held for the bankrupt
by a warehouse to be delivered to the trustee. During the interval
between the execution of the original agreement with the warehouse
and the institution of bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor had "consigned" a quantity of books as collateral to secure several loans. The
district court affirmed the referee's ruling that the books fell within
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court since the warehouse was
17
holding the books pursuant to an agreement with the bankrupt.
Finding the warehouse's claim to the books adverse to the debtor's
claim, the court of appeals reversed, however, holding that the trustee would have to seek recovery by means of plenary suit since:
"[The bankrupt did not have unconditional control over the books
in the hands of the warehouse. Indeed, the evidence indicates that
bankrupt had little control if any at all."' 8
The emphasis in Bailes upon the debtor's lack of control over his
property is instructive in connection with a dispute between a bank15.
16.
17.
18.

Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1923). See note 14 supra.
426 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 162-63.
Id.at 164.
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ruptcy trustee and the IRS as in Chicagoland and General Wood
since the service of notice of levy upon a third party holder of a
solvent taxpayer's property clearly deprives the taxpayer of any
effective control over the property." A taxpayer's insolvency should
not alter the lack of control that normally results from a notice of
levy. Even more persuasive than the issue of control or the difficulties of the possession question is the effect upon possession of the
service of notice of levy in another context within the Bankruptcy
Act.
Postponement of Tax Liens Under the Bankruptcy Act
Section 67c(3) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that tax liens on
personal property, not accompanied by possession, are to be subordinate to the payment of administration expenses and wage claims
in the Act's priority of recovery scheme. 2' It has been stated that this
section was enacted to penalize taxing authorities for inaction,2' and
to ensure that administrative expenses and small wage claims
could be met. 2 Tax liens accompanied by possession of the property, however, constitute secured claims which have first priority
over the proceeds of the estate and are not postponed behind administration expenses and wage claimants in order of recovery.2
One of the first cases considering the question whether a notice
of levy establishes sufficient possession over intangible property to
protect the Government's claim from postponement was United
States v. Eiland.24 In finding the requisite possession in the Govern19. See note 54 infra & accompanying text.
20. Section 67c(3) provides, in part: 'Every tax lien on personal property not accompanied
by possession shall be postponed in payment to the debts specified in clauses (1)
[administration cost] and (2) [wage claims] of subdivision (a) of section 64 of this Act."
11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(3) (1970). See also 4 CoLLmR ON BAmNurcy 67.281, at 426 (14th ed.
1972).
21. City of New York v. Hall, 139 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1944).
22. California State Dep't of Employment v. United States, 210 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1954).
23. See note 20 supra.
24. 223 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1955).
The two types of notice that may be involved in the postponement situation must be
differentiated clearly. A notice of tax lien filed in the appropriate location, designated by state
law, is required to protect the Government's interest in the taxpayer's property covered by
the lien. INT.Rhv.CODE oF 1954, § 6323. A second kind of notice is the notice of levy given to
a third party who owes money to the taxpayer or who has in his possession property belonging
to the taxpayer. This notice requires the third party to repay the debt to the Government
rather than to the delinquent taxpayer. INT. Rhv.CODE OF 1954, §§ 6331-32. For a discussion
of the significance of these differences applied to the postponement problem, see notes 46-56
infra & accompanying text.
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ment so as to preclude postponement, the Court of the Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit confused later courts2 by discussing two distinct
issues without sufficient clarity to differentiate the bases of the
decision.
The initial issue the Eiland court confronted was whether the
trustee in bankruptcy could qualify as a protected party under section 2672(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, the predecessor
of section 6323(a) of the 1954 Code.26 An affirmative answer to this
question would have rendered a federal tax lien invalid against a
trustee until the tax authority properly notified him of the lien.
Construing the statute as applicable only to tangible personal property, however, the court determined that it offered no protection to
a trustee when the dispute over possession concerned intangible
property.'
The second issue in Filand was whether proper service of notice
of levy allowed the serving agency to "possess" a debt owed the
bankrupt by a third party such that the tax lien would avoid postponement under section 67c(3) of the Bankruptcy Act. Predicating
its decision on two alternate grounds, the court of appeals in Eitand
concluded that the tax lien would not face postponement since service of a proper notice of levy established the Government's possession of the debt. The court first suggested that section 67c(3) does
not apply to intangible personalty's since, according to the court, an
intangible asset would normally prove difficult to reduce to possession. Although section 67c(3) speaks unqualifiedly in terms of "personal property,"2 the court was willing to read into the statute a
limitation to "tangible personal property" only. The alternate
25. For apparent misinterpretations or misunderstandings of the Eilanddecision, compare
In re United General Wood Prods. Corp., 483 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1973), with In re BrewsterRaymond, 344 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1965).
26. INT.Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 6323(a), provides in part: "The lien imposed by section 6321

shall not be valid as against any purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic's lienor,
or judgment lien creditor until notice thereof. . . has been filed by the Secretary or his
delegate." This language has the same substantive effect as the relevant section 3672(a)
language in the 1939 Code.
Some litigation has arisen concerning the status of a trustee and whether he must receive
notice of a tax lien. The consensus now favors according judgment creditor status to trustees
under section 70(c), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970); therefore trustees must receive notice of tax

liens if the liens are to be valid against the assets the trustees control. See United States v.

Speers, 382 U.S. 266 (1965).
27. 223 F.2d at 122.
28. Id. at 123.
29. See note 20 supra.
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ground of the decision was the court's conclusion that proper service
of a notice of levy was sufficient to reduce an intangible, such as a
debt owed, to possession for purposes of section 67c(3) .1 Neither the
court of appeals in Eiland nor subsequent cases refusing to follow
Eiland3l have cited any precedent in support of their respective
conclusions. Similarly, cases which have followed Eiland have justified the same ultimate conclusion merely by citing Eiland without
32
further elaboration.
One case refusing to accept the Eiland view that proper service
of a notice of levy will reduce an intangible to possession is In re
Brewster-Raymond Co.,3 in which the United States sought to recover tax penalties by serving, prior to the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy, a notice of levy upon a third party debtor of the taxpayer. Specifically rejecting the Government's contention that its
notice gave it possession of an intangible indebtedness as against
the trustee in bankruptcy, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
ruled that possession-had remained in the hands of the bankrupt
until-he fied his petition in bankruptcy, at which time all of his
possession passed to the trustee.34 Recognizing that the res in question was an intangible, the court stated: "[L]evy (in the sense it is
used here) is merely one of many means of perfecting a lien ...
It does not in and of itself operate to transfer title to the govern35
ment."
Elaborating further its opinion that the Government does not
obtain possession through proper service of notice of levy, the court
stated: "Counsel for the United States has cited no authority, nor
have we found any, that holds that the United States has anything
more than a lien when it [serves a notice of levy] upon intangible
personal property." 36 Relying upon this silence,37 the court reasoned
30. 223 F.2d at 123.
31. In re United General Wood Prods. Corp., 483 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1973); In re BrewsterRaymond Co., 344 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1965).
32. See In re Chicagoland Ideel Cleaners, Inc., 495 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1974); Rosenblum
v. United States, 300 F.2d 834 (1st Cir. 1962); Consumers Power Co. v. Rubiner, 225 F. Supp.
926 (E.D. Mich. 1963); Summer v. Allison, 127 Ga. App. 217, 193 S.E.2d 177 (1972); In re
Couterier, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9351 (W.D. Mich. 1971); In re Venda Mfg. Inc., 60-2 U.S.

Tax Cas. 9480 (S.D. Cal. 1960). Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Patterson-EmersonComstock, 227 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Ind. 1963). See also United States v. Pittman, 449 F.2d
623 (7th Cir. 1971).

33. 344 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1965).
34. Id. at 910.

35. Id.
36. Id.

37. Although not cited by the court, there is support for the court's position in the litera-
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that "anything short of the passing of title" would give the Government only a lien in its favor and certainly would not pass possession38
Perhaps the strongest argument that may be advanced in favor
of the Brewster-Raymond position is set forth in the published
works of bankruptcy writers. After tracing the legislative history of
section 67c, one authority concluded:
The possibility that a levy may not give rise to possession within
the meaning of former § 67c(1) was suggested by the fact that
former § 67c(2) invalidated ... statutory liens on personalty
"not accompanied by possession of, or by levy upon or by sequestration or distraint of, such property." The draftsmen manifestly considered that a lien on personalty might be accompanied by levy but not by possession, since otherwise reference to
levy in § 67c(2) would have been unnecessary. . . . That constructive possession is insufficient under former § 67c(1), see
City of New York v. Hall. . .. The same result should follow
under present § 67c(3).11
Justice Douglas, after a review of the relevant legislative history
of the Bankruptcy Act in United States v. Randall," concluded:
We have then a progressive legislative development that (1)
marks a decline in the grant of a tax preference to the United
States and (2) marks an ascending priority for costs and expenses of administration.
We think the statutory policy of subordinating taxes to costs
and expenses of administration would not be served by creating
or enforcing trusts which eat up an estate, leaving little or nothing for creditors and court officers whose goods and services
created the assets. 4'
Although these arguments appear to support the reasoning of

Brewster-Raymond, each is drawn from a limited context which
does not bear extension. Justice Douglas, in Randall, was applying
his analysis to an entirely different area of the tax and bankruptcy
laws. Determinative in Randall was the question whether the
ture. See 9 J.

ME=Ts, LAw OFEDERAL

38. 344 F.2d at 909.
39. 4 COLLR ON BANKRuPmcY
o

BANKRupTcy

§ 1637.2 (1957).

40. 401 U.S. 513 (1971).
41. Id. at 516-17.

INcoME TAXAiON § 54.29,'at 73 (1971).

67.24, at 325 n.21a (14th ed. 1972). See also 4 REMINGTON
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United States would be given priority over a fund which it claimed
a party had set aside in constructive trust specifically to pay taxes
withheld from employee salaries. The Court, in a five-four decision,
rejected the Government's argument that a trust fund had been
created. Thus, the Randall decision would appear to have relatively
little precedential value when extended beyond its particular facts
regarding the existence or nonexistence of a trust.12 Moreover, the

Court's discussion of the legislative history of the statutory lien
invalidation sections, 67c(1) and (2), does not resolve the problems
of postponement of tax liens unaccompanied by possession under
section 67c(3). 3
42. At issue in Randall was whether the Government would be given priority as to certain
moneys in the bankrupt's estate where the debtor had failed to deposit the taxes withheld in
a special tax account. Concluding that the United States would be entitled to a claim as a
general creditor rather than a priority creditor, the Court rejected the claim of the Government that Internal Revenue Code section 7501(a) (deeming any taxes withheld by a person
required to do so "a special fund in trust for the United States") provided a basis for a
constructive trust in favor of the United States. The thrust of the argument for the majority
was that the Bankruptcy Act overrode all other federal statutory policies. Moreover, the Court
found a legislative belief that the balancing of the equities of the situation required the
Government rather than the general creditors to bear the cost of the failure of the debtors to
deposit the taxes withheld.
The supposition that creditors benefit by a postponement of federal taxes may not be
correct in many instances. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has viewed with some
alarm that "in all personal bankruptcy cases 41% of the assets of the estates are paid out for
trustees' fees and other administration expenses. . . ."Inre Kokoszka, 479 F.2d 990, 995 (2d
Cir. 1973), aff'd, 94 S.Ct. 2431 (1974).
While taxes withheld do not constitute a trust fund (unless separately held expressly for
that purpose), they are not postponed entirely to administrative and wage claims. In Otte v.
United States, 95 S. Ct. 247 (1974), the Court held that federal taxes must be withheld from
second priority wage payments (owed for work completed before bankruptcy) and paid over
to the IRS. Randall was distinguished with the observation that it was "not a holding, as
the trustee would claim, . . that the withholding taxes do not have the same priority as
the wage claims themselves." Id. at 257.
43. Subsection (1) of section 67c provides: "The following liens shall be invalid against the
trustee: (A) every statutory lien which becomes effective upon the insolvency of the debtor
; (B) [those not effective at the date of bankruptcy against a bona fide purchaser
whether or not such a purchaser exists]; (C) every statutory lien for rent and every lien of
distress for rent, whether statutory or not." 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1) (1970). Subsection (2) allows
the court to maintain any of the liens in subsection (1) for the benefit of the estate with such
lien passing to the trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(2) (1970). To be effective against federal tax
liens, the liens of other statutory, judgment, or consensual creditors must be choate; that is,
the liens must be certain as to the amount, as to the identity of the lienor, and the liens must
have attached to specific property before the federal tax lien arises. See, e.g., United States
v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953) (by implication). Furthermore, under the
federal debt priority statute, 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970) (commonly known by its Revised Statutes
designation, section 3466), even though a federal tax lien is not "choate," it takes absolute
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Another argument urged in favor of postponement, suggested by
Justice Douglas' opinion in Randall,4 is grounded in the public
policy favoring a bankruptcy system which "pays its own way."
Such a policy, even if desirable, nevertheless should arise from a
more explicit source than section 67c(3) which, as previously noted,
was enacted in part to penalize the taxing authority for delay in
acting upon its lien." Such a case was not presented in BrewsterRaymond where the Government acted without delay through its
notice of levy to reduce to possession the property of the taxpayer.
Thus, Brewster-Raymond, like Eiland, is grounded on inconclusive analysis, possibly because the court apparently gave inadequate consideration to all tax code provisions that could have had
a bearing on resolution of the case. For example, the conclusion that
a notice of levy is merely one means of perfecting a tax lien, a
conclusion that may be applicable to state tax liens, does not seem
to apply to federal tax liens;" Code section 6321 provides that a lien
shall arise on all of the taxpayer's "property and rights to property"
once demand is made and the tax not paid.47 Although relating back
to the date of assessment,"8 the lien is not valid against certain
interests until the Government has filed notice of lien in an appropriate location." Faced with this explicit statutory scheme for perfecting federal tax liens, the Brewster-Raymond conclusion that a
notice of levy is simply another means for perfecting a tax lien
appears less than satisfactory.
Notice of levy may be understood better as one step in the process
by which the Government takes possession of the property in payment of taxes due. Section 6331(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
provides that a notice of levy may be served on a third party 10 days
after demand has been made on the taxpayer for the purpose of
collecting such tax."0 This levy reaches "all property and rights to
property." 5' Levy is defined to include "the power of distraint and
priority over other liens unperfected at the time it arises when the taxpayer is insolvent. A
petition in bankruptcy cuts off this priority, however, and subjects the tax lien to the conditions of section 67c(3).
44. 401 U.S. at 517 (by implication).
45. See note 21 supra & accompanying text.
46. See note 43 supra.
47. INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 6321.
48. Id. § 6322.

49. Id. § 6323. See note 26 supra.
50. INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 6331(a).
51. See note 4 supra.
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seizure by any means, 5'

2

and it effectively controls both tangible

and intangible property. 3 A third party's unreasonable failure to
comply with the levy can result in that party's being held personally
liable 4 for the amount levied plus a 50 percent penalty. 5 Upon
compliance by the third party debtor with the levy requirements,
however, he is protected thereafter against any subsequent claims
by another party seeking the property. The Code thus places third
party debtors, those owing money to the bankrupt, in a precarious
position during this struggle for control of the assets. If debts are

paid to the trustee, instead of to the Government in accordance with
the tax levy, the debtor may be forced to pay twice, once to the
trustee and once to the Government.
Considering the amount of control that service of a proper notice
of levy grants the Government over a bankrupt's property held by

third parties, it seems apparent that the Eiland court was correct
in holding that a federal tax lien on intangible assets is not postponed in favor of administration expenses and certain wage claimants once a notice of levy is served. As Eilandsuggested, this conclu-

sion accords with the decisions holding that a notice of levy transfers
constructive possession of the intangible asset to the Government.-7
Moreover, Congress, when faced with a conflict concerning the ne-

cessity of issuing a writ of distraint along with a notice of levy, 8

responded by including in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 a
52. INT. IEv. CODE OF 1954, § 6331(b).
53. See United States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1964). The court stated: "Statutory
levy is substantially broader in scope than anything known to the common law, and it is
applicable to intangible as well as to tangible property." Id. at 116.
54. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6332(c)(1). In Rosenblum v. United States, 300 F.2d 843 (1st
Cir. 1962), the Government sought to hold four debtors liable for transfers to the trustee of
property on which the Government previously had levied. The trustee attempted to intervene
and argue that the notice of levy did iot create sufficient possession in the Government to
satisfy section 67c(3), but the court rejected its argument, affirming the personal liability of
the debtors flowing from their failure to comply with the notice of levy.
55. r. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6332(c)(2). See United States v. Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 360 F. Supp. 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (action to recover penalty for bank's failure to honor
a tax levy made upon checking account of taxpayer by the IRS).
56. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6332(d).

57. The Eiland holding also suggests that section 67c(3) might not apply to intangibles.
Consequently, the tax lien recognized by section 67b would not be postponed. See notes 28.
29 supra & accompanying text. See generally, 9 J. MnrzNs, LAw oF FEDERAL INcome
TAxATioN § 54.29, at 73 (1961).

58. Compare United States v. O'Dell, 160 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1947), with United States v.
Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 198 F. Supp. 157 (N.D.N.Y. 1961).
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broad definition of levy which encompasses "seizure by any
59
means."

The result reached in Brewster-Raymond may be explained by
the position taken by the Government in presenting the case. Rather
than argue that a notice of levy endowed it with constructive possession of the intangible, the Government elected to assert that proper
service of a notice of levy gave it outright ownership of the intangible. The court proved unwilling so to hold, concluding that it was
"of the opinion that if the effect-of the levy amount[ed] to anything
short of the passing of title, it would constitute but a lien in favor
of the government.""0 Thus, with no middle ground in controversy,
the court of appeals concluded in Brewster-Raymond that the bankruptcy court held summary jurisdiction over the indebtedness owed
the bankrupt and urged that the service of a notice of levy to a third
party holder had only the effect of perfecting the lien granted by
section 67b.
In Brewster-Raymond the court read the Bankruptcy Act, particularly sections 67b and 67c(3), as making inapplicable the lien provisions of sections 6321, 6322, and 6323 of the Internal Revenue
Code6' as applied to bankruptcy. This purported restructuring of the
federal tax laws by implication represents an overzealous attempt
to reach the "desirable conclusion" that administration expenses be
given top priority, without a thorough review of all applicable laws
and a careful estimation of what the results of such a change could
be. It would appear more logical to view a notice of levy served on
a third party debtor as a means of "collecting" the taxes owed rather
than as a mere mechanism for perfecting a lien. In contrast to the
Brewster-Raymond decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reached a more reasonable result in Eiland since that holding conforms with the view of Code sections 6321 through 6323 that
a valid, perfected lien is created by demand, the taxpayer's failure
to pay, and filing of notice. The degree of control that the Govern59. TNT. REv. CODE OP 1954, § 6331(b) provides: "The term 'levy' as used in this title

includes the power of distraint and seizure by any means." For the legislative history of
section 6331, see 3 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3738 (1966); 3 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
4555, 4776, 5225 (1954).

60. 344 F.2d at 909.
61. Rather than viewing section 67b as a recognition of the federal tax scheme embodied
in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the court in Brewster-Raymond seemed to see section
67b as merely providing for a tax lien, and it subjected that lien to the traditional requirements of any statutory lien. However, it is doubtful that the federal tax lien can be equated
with the standard statutory lien. See United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361
(1953).
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ment exercises over a third party holding property of the taxpayer
suggests that section 6331 of the Code was created to provide for
more than the mere perfection of tax liens.
It is submitted, therefore, that a federal tax lien on intangible
assets should not be postponed in.favor of administration expenses
and wage claimants where the Government has served a notice of
levy on the third party holder prior to the institution of bankruptcy
proceedings. Conversely, if the Government fails to initiate its
collection process by obtaining possession of the assets through service of notice of levy prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition, its
tax lien should be subordinated to administration expenses and
wage claims. This approach is not only easy for the courts to adopt,
but in addition, its imposition of a penalty upon the tax authorities
for their inaction gives effect to one of the major purposes for which
62
section 67c(3) was enacted.
Similar effect should be accorded to the service of notice of levy
for the purpose of determining whether a bankruptcy court has summary jurisdiction over intangible property held by a third party for
an insolvent taxpayer. In accordance with the normal statutory procedure, 3 filing a petition in bankruptcy should give the court jurisdiction which is not disturbed by subsequent service of notice of levy
upon the third party. Notice of levy served before the bankruptcy
petition is filed, however, should give the Government sufficient
possession so as to deprive the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction to
adjudicate the respective claims to the property.
The anomaly of a failure to accord possessory significance to the
notice of levy is apparent from a comparison between the Eiland
and General Wood decisions. Application of both of those decisions
62. See note 21 supra & accompanying text..

Tangible personal property does not present the same problem as intangible property.
Unlike intangibles, tangibles are capable of demonstrable actual physical possession. Thus
mere notice of levy in connection with tangible personal property would be insufficient to
establish possession in the IRS as against the trustee in bankruptcy. Section 67c(3) of the
Bankruptcy Act points to the necessity of actual physical possession in order to keep property
claimed under a federal tax lien out of the hands of the trustee. See 4 CoMan ON BANKtrUrCY

67.281 [2.20] (14th ed. 1972). This position has received implied support from the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Commenting upon the Eiland case and the sufficiency of
notice of levy to obtain possession of an asset, the court stated: ". . . Eiland involved the
levy upon an intangible indebtedness rather than upon corporeal property as here and we

would hesitate to extend its holding." United States v. Pittman, 449 F.2d 623, 627 (1971).
Actual physical possession in the IRS thus appears to be necessary if the Government is to
uphold its claim upon tangible property as a result of notice of levy.
63. Bankruptcy Act § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970).
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would result in service of notice of levy being held to impart sufficient "possession" to prevent postponement of the lien under one
section of the Bankruptcy Act, while in the jurisdictional sense,
where the test also is "possession," the same notice of levy would
be held insufficient to prevent the bankruptcy court from exercising
its summary jurisdiction over the assets. Although the opinions in
both Chicagolandand General Wood failed to document adequately
their respective conclusions, it seems that the failure of the court of
appeals in General Wood to consider the effect that prior case law
regarding section 67c(3) would have on its jurisdictional determination seriously undermines its position. Apparently the Government
raised this argument before the court by citing cases such as Eiland,
but was unsuccessful because the argument was rejected on the
ground that none of the cases dealt with the issue of summary
jurisdiction.6 4 While it is true that these cases revolved around postponement, that issue concerned the presence of "possession"; the
interpretation of the respective statutes involved could well have
been applied to the analagous situation in General Wood. Consequently, General Wood and Brewster-Raymond seem to have erred
by not giving closer attention to prior judicial analysis of section
67c(3) of the Bankruptcy Act.
Conclusion
Congress currently is examining proposals made by the Bankruptcy Commission which would supplant entirely the present
Bankruptcy Act by creating a system of independent courts of barikruptcy and an independent agency within the executive branch, to
be known as the United States Bankruptcy Administration. In
terms of the issues presented in this Comment, the new courts of
bankruptcy would be given the power to adjudicate conclusively
questions concerning the rights to property even only arguably subject to administration through the bankruptcy process. As one commentator has noted: "The present troublesome and wasteful dichotomy between summary and plenary jurisdiction would be abolished,
so that all actions to avoid transfers, to enforce debtors' or creditors'
rights under the Act, as well as all actions involving the receiver or
trustee as a party could be tried in the bankruptcy court."6 5
64. 483 F.2d at 976.
65. Cyr, The Bankruptcy Act of 1973: Back to the Drafting Board,48 Am.BANKH. L.J. 45,
53 (1974). For a complete exposition of these proposals, see CoMMIsoN ON THE BAKRU~rcY
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Until Congress provides an alternative solution which would
avoid premising bankruptcy jurisdiction upon possession and which
would obviate distinctions between plenary and summary jurisdiction in bankruptcy litigation, bankruptcy courts must operate
within the confines of the present statute and existing case law.
According to the better view, service of notice of levy before a bankruptcy petition is filed avoids postponement of tax liens. Because
possession is the test in both instances, timely notice also should
operate to deprive the bankruptcy court of summary jurisdiction
over controverted property.
LAws OF THE UNrr

STATES, REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). For

further commentary on the conclusions reached by the Commission, see Walker, An Introduction to the ProposedBankruptcy Act of 1973. From Revision to Revolution, 41 TnsN. L. Rv.

635 (1974).

